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A. C. B u r n e t t
Cornell University, School of Law.
1889.
Chattel
IUnder the old Common Law the similarity between
chattel mortgages and mortgages on real estate was
much greater than at the present time. With the Corn-
mon Law mortgage on realty the title to the property
passed with the mortgage to the mortgagee, while at
present the mortgagor retains the legal title, the
mortgagee having only an equitable lien on the property
mortgaged. This was indeed a wise invasion on the
rights of the mortgagee, but owing to the character of
chattels a similar change would perhaps be impracti-
cable. As has always been in the law of chattel mort-
gages, they still retain the character of a conditional
sale, absol~te title passing to the mortgagee subject
to revertment upon performance of the condition; and they
differ from a pledge in that the property is retained
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by the mortgagor, while in the latter the title remains
in the pledgor and the property itself passes to the
pledgee.
In Roman Law the term pignus was used and corres-
ponded to the Present term pledge, but where there was
no actual transfer then the Latin hypotheca was applied,
but later, hypotheca was only applicable to real prop-
erty or immovable things.
The law of chattel mortgages is of wide extent in
this country and it would be useless to attempt to give
a comprehensive idea of its different divisions in a
discussion of this kind, in view of which fact this
subject will be confined to Chattel Mortgages on Prop-
erty not in Possession.
The most natural divisions of the subject are:
(a) Property non in esse, (b) though in nsse, not in
3possession; but for convenience they will be discussed
together.
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINE.
The doctrine of the Civil Law as given in brief
by Domat is as follows: " Those who bind themselves by
any engagement whatsoever may, for the security of
their performance of the engagement on their part, ap-
propriate and mortgage, not only the estate which they
are masters of at the time of contracting, but like-
wise all the estate they shall thereafter be seized or
possessed of. And this mortgage extends to all the
things they shall afterward acquire, that are 6apable
of being mortgaged, by what title soever it be that they
acquire them, and even to those that are not in being
when the obligation is contracted; so that the fruits
w
which shall grow upon the lands will be comprehended in
a mortgage of an estate to come. Although the mort-
gage be restrained to certain things, yet it will, nev-
ertheless, extend to all that shall arise or proceed
from that thing which is mortgaged or that shall aug-
ment it and make part of it. Thus the fruits which
grow on the lands that are mortgaged are subject to the
mortgage while they continue unseparated from the
ground. Thus, when a stud of horses, a herd of cattle,
or a flock of sheep is put in pawn into the creditzor t s
hands, the foals, the lambs and other beasts which they
bring forth, and which augment their number, are like-
wise engaged for the creditor's security. And if the
whole head or flock be entirely changed, the heads
which have renewed it are engaged in the same manner
as the old stock. Thus, when the bounds of a piece
of ground. that is mortgaged happen to be enlarged by
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that which the course of a river may add to it, the
mortgage entends to that which has augmented the ground.
Thus, a house built on ground which is mortgaged is
subject likewise to the mortgage. Ahd if, on the con-
trary, a house be mortgaged, and it perishes by fire,
or falls through decay, the mortgage will subsist on
the ground where the house stood. Thus, when a debtor
mortgages a piece of ground of which he has only the
bare property, another enjoying the usufruct of it,
I
when the said right to the usufruct of it comes to be
extinct, the mortgage will comprehend the grounds with
the fruits."
From this doctrine of the Civil Law there seems
to be no difficulty in making a mortgag.e which shall op-
erate on property acquired in futuro, or on property
non in esse.
COMMON ILAW DO CTRINE .
There seems to be little conflict in the earlier
cases that it is impossible to grant a title to any
person in property in which there is at the time no
potential interest. But an attempt to grant an inter-
est in such property is looked upon by Lord Bacon as
a declaration precedent which may be ratified after pos-
session is obtained, or may be countermanded.
What might constitute ratification is doubtful.
A conveyance, of course, would be sufficient, but unques-
tionably the simple acquisition of the property would
be insufficient. The question of ratification, howev-
er, will be discussed later.
In the court of Common Pleas it was concluded, in
the case of Lane vs. Thornton, that a grant of goods
not in esse or which do not belong to the grantor
6
7at the time o0 the grant is void unless there is a rat-
ification of the grant after acquisition of the prop-
erty; which was supported by the case of Grantham vs.
Hawley, Hob. Reps., 132.
Tn 50 Miss. 399, the doctrine was deduced that at
law the property or thing must be in esse at the time,
yet in equity, there may be a pledge or hypotheca as
soon as the chattel shall be acquired or produced.
In 20 Barb. 37, it was held that a chattel mortgage cam-
not be given on future products of the land, but this
case is to be distinguished from Stuart vs. Taylor,
7 How. Pr. Reps. 251, in which the mortgagor owning the
land, mortgaged his interest, a certain number of acres
of wheat, and the mortgage was held good.
In Comstock vs. Scales, 7 Wis. 159; a chattel
mortgage was given on oats, wheat and corn about the
8time the grain was planted, but before it was up.
Held not good, because it not being in esse, there was
nothing to which the mortgage could attach.
In making a digest of the cases we find from the
earliest decisions down to the present time the opinions
are quite consistent with little digression from what
may be considered a uniform doctrine that at law, grants
or assignments of property having no actual or potential
existence at the time of such grant or assignment are void
ab initio, and that such possibilities or expectancies
are not assignable.
In order, however, that there may be no misunder-
standing of the above statement it will be necessary to
give a definition of what constitutes potential existence
A precise definition which may be applied in all cases is
difficult to give, but it may be broadly defined as
9the natural product or expected increase of something
already existing, and therefore potential interest arises
when thereis possession or ownership of the agent of pro-
duction.
Mr. Overton, in his treatise on the law of Liens,
after a careful consideration of the possibility of
mortgages on property acquired 0n futuro, gives three
different conclusions at which the courts seem to have,
arrived.
1. "That a mortgage which undertakes to convey
after-acquired property, or accession to property actual-
ly conveyed is null and void wholly as to such after-
acquired chattels, both' as between the parties to the
mort gage, and as to all third persons. Hence the mort-
gager may sell, and in all respects deal with such prop-
erty as if it be wholly his own."
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2. "That while such mortgage is not binding as a
contract of conveyance at law, yet, it will be as be-
tween the parties and third persons who have by attach-
ment, conveyance or otherwise, acquired intervening
rights, treated in equity as valid and obligatory, and
may be enforced.,,
"3. "That such a mortgage is valid and binding both
at law and in equity, and if duly recorded, will be up-
held and sustained by the courts, both as between the
original parties and against third persons."
It appears that the cases do not uniformly support
his conclusions, but had he inserted in his first di-
vision "after-acquired property in which there is no
potential interest ," the conclusion would have been
more nearly correct; for it seems not to have been dis-
puted that a person can grant the wool not yet grown
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frorn the sheep of which he is actual owner, or the milk
of his cows of which he is in possession. But a grant
of wool from sheep not the property of the mortgagor,
or of dairy products, the cows not being the property
of the mortgagor, are, by reason of there being no
potential interest, void ab initio at law.
We have ever to keep prominently in mind the ques-
tion of potential existence and potential possession,
If we could always definitely determine what constitutes
potential interest there would be little reason for con-
flicting opinions, but it is here the difficulty arises.
Doubtless a lessee of' property has a potential interest
in the property which he has leased; but by reason of'
such lease, does he acquire a potential interest in the
crops not yet sown, and can he mortgage such interest,
if there be any? In this case there seems to be two
12
sides to the question, and the opinions are conflicting
to quite an extent, but in general a lessee may grant a
valid mortgage on crops thereafter to be grown to his
lessor, as a guarantee of the rent of the premises, but
a mortgage to third persons where the crops are yet un-
planted is generally held invalid; and this is so even
between the lessor and lessee where the mortgage is
executed as security for payment of rent, and the lessee
has not yet taken possession; for in this case, there
can possibly be no potential interest in the lessee by
virtue of which he may execute this mortgage. In nearly
all the late cases the validity of the mortgage depends
upon the peculiar circumstances of each case.
The discription given in the mortgage of the crops
intended to be mortgaged must be definite, so that no
question may arise as to the intention of the parties.
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In 11 N. W. Rep., 621, Vhere a description of the prop-
ertymortgaged was " all the crops raised by me in any
part of Jones County, fo1 the term of three years" it was
very Justly held to be too indefinite and uncertain a
description to charge third persons with notice of the
existence of the mottgage, though the former opinion
in the case was reversed. In 24 Iowa, 322, it was s4id
that a description of property in a chattel mortgage is
sufficient when it is such as will enable third parties,
aided by inquiries which the instrument itself indi-
cates and directs., to identify the property covered
by it.
Though the mortgage be valid as between mortgagor
and mortgagee, whether such chattel is valid as against
creditors of the mortgagor is an unsettled question.
I# the case above cited the decision is not based on
14
this question, but in 35 Iowa 66, a mortgage was giv-
en upon all the stock in trade of the mortgagor and the
mortgage contained the following clause: "including
all stock and fixtures now or hereafter kept in my
said leather business in the city of Keokuk, Lee County,
Iowa." The mortgagee gave the mortgage to the sher-
iff for foreclosure who took possession of the stock,
including that added after the making of the mortgage,
and a compromise was made between the mortgagor and
mortgagee by which the mortgagee took the property
and gave the mortgagor credit for the agreed value.
Later, creditors attached the property in the hands
of the mortgagee, claiming that the mortgage, so far as
the property acquired in futuro was concerned, was void,
but he mortgage was held good as covering the entire
property; and this case was upheld in 65 Towa 306, and
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in 9 N. W. Rep., 215. But is there any difference in
principle, between a mortgage upon crops to be planted
and grown upon specified lands, and a mortgage upon ad-
ditions made to the mortgaged stock of a merchant?
Tt is said in the first case there is no potential
existence, while in the latter additions are merely in-
cidents of the original property included in the mort-
gage.
It is also held in a Wisconsin case (21 N. W.
Rep., 62) that a mortgage on a crop thereafter to be
raised is void as against a subsequent purchaser, un-
less before such purchase the mortgagee takes actual
possession of the property; and so far as I am able to
ascertain, from any cases- where there are aony decisions
on the question, it seems to be universal that subse-
quent purchasers without notice have a preference over
16
the mortgagee.
An agreement between lessor and lessee that the
lessor shall have title to the crop as security for
the payment of rents should act, it seems to me, as an
equitable lien or equitable interest in the crop, rather
than as a chattel mortgage; but the cases generally hold it
to be a chattel mortgage, and it even has been held to
cover a crop after it has been sold to -a third person.
This is clearly inequitable and oversteps the boundry
of the general holding of the courts, where no notice
has come to the purchaser.
The case of' Hutchenson vs. Ford, 9 Bush ,will at
first appear to overturn the doctrine that future crops
may be mortgaged; but in this case, the mortgagor had
not entered into possession at the time of the execu-
tion of the mortgage, a fact that must al-.ays be taken
17
into consideration, as was stated in the early part of
the article. And too, the execution of thie mortgage was
to a surety on a note given for payment of the rent; so
this case would scarcoly fall within the general rule
as a contra case, This decision is founded upon the
purely legal doctrine, but such a mortgage would be
supported in equity.
It seems peculiar that the products of a dairy,
or a growth of wool not yet in esse, might, at Common
Law,be mortgaged, while a crop not yet planted was not
subject to mortgage. The idea of potential existence
arises, but why the courts should hold that the pro-
ducts of a dairy were any more in potential existence,
why there should be any more of a potential interest
existing in them than in an unsown crop, is by no means
clear. The fact of the existence in the one case de-
v18
pends Las much on, and is as much the result of the pro-
ductivemess of the soil as in the other. True, the
the relation between the soil and the products of the
dairy, or the wool from the sheep is one step farther re-
moved than the relation between the soil and crops; but
why that fact should be considered is not explainable,
nor, strictly speaking, is there any more of a poten-
tial existence in the one case than in the other.
It seems that the courts must draw a line somewhere as
to possibility of mortgaging property, and it was said
that property having a potential existence might be
mortgaged, and that anything not existing potentially
could not be the siubject of a mottgage. And then the
line was no more distinct, because it could not be de-
termined definitely what constituted potential existence
and interest.
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As soon as we reach perennial crops, however, the
same difficulty does not arise, for there labor is not
required to produce the existence of the crop, and the
roots are continually in the soil.
can be no reason for litigation.
EQU ITABLE
In this case there
DO0C TRIYNE .
When we look at the equitable side of the question,
there immediately arises a different theory; a theory
which it is most unfortunate the coutts of earlier
times did not reach; a theory which looks after the in-
terests of the parties, and does not adhere to the
strict formalities of the old Connon Law; a theory
which is not the slave of precedent, but which has done
so much for the rights of the people by breaking away
from the cast iron rules by which the judges have been
bound, and throwing open to the world a path by which one
19
may acquire what properly belongs to one, or may com-
pel one to do what ought in all justness and fairness
to be done.
At law , we determined that there must be an actual
or potential interest in property in order that a mort-
gage may be ualid between persons othor than those to
the mortgage, unless the mortgagee had possession of
the property before third persons acquired rights a-
gainst it. Under the equitable theory, however, no
legal title vests in the mortgagee, but like the present
mortgage of real estate, he acquires an equitable inter-
est in the property the moment it comes into existence,
and it is not necessary that t-e mortgagar in any way ac-
knowledge the mortgagee's title, nor can third persons,
with notice, acquire any rights by reason of being sub-
sequent purchasers or creditors.
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While the CoTlMon Law doctrine was too strict, this
would seem to have reached the opposite extrene. Tn
equity, however, eachi case stands upon its own peculiat
ground, and the interest of the parties is always of
paramout consideration. The doctrine was settled
by the most important English case of Holroyd vs. Mar-
shall, 10 House of Lords Cases, 189, in which a very
thorough review was made of all the cases affecting
this doctrine, and for the purpose of this article, it
will be profitable to give the facts of the case and
the conclusion of the court, which is a complete digest
of the English law as it now stands.
Jarnes Taylor was the owner of certain rgachinery
in a mill, and this machinery was purchased by A. P.and
Taylor executed a deed declaring the ma-W.Holroyd.
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chinery to be the property of Holroyd, and that Taylor
desired to repurchase it, but by reason of his not hav-
ing the money to do so, it was conveyed to one Tsaac
Brint as trustee, until demand of payment was made upon
Taylor, and if he should then pay the Holrords 5000
pomds, with interest, it should re-vest absolutely in
Taylor, but upon default by Taylor, Brunt should have
power of sale and hold the money to pay off the Hol-
royds. There was a covenant to insure, and also a cov-
enant that all the machinery thereafter placed in the
mill in addition to, or in substitution for the orig-
inal machinery, should be subject to the same trusts.
Some of the original machinery was sold by Taylor and
new machinery placed in thie mill, and notice of the
s~ee waa sent to the Holroyds, but nothing was done by
them to take possession of the nww machinery. Tn Ap-pil
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1860, Holroyd served Taylor with notice of demand for
payment of the 5000 pounds, and later a creditor of
Taylor put in an execution against him, and the ques-
tion arose as to whether the equitable rnortgagees were
entitled to preference over the execution creditor with
respect to the added, as well as the original machinery.
In the lower court, Lord Chancellor Campbell gave judg-
ment in favor of the execution creditor; resting his
decision on Lord Bacon's maxim, "Licet dispositio de
interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen fieri potest de-
claratio praecedens quae sortiatur effectum, interveni-
ente novo actu,"~ thus thinking it necessary that there
be the .interveniente novo actu" in order that the equi-
table mortgagee's title have precedence over a legal
interest; but it appears that Lord Campbell labored under
the ,delusion that this maxim extended to equitable as
23
well as legal rights and interests, and in consequence,
his decision was rendered under a false impression of
the applieation of the maxim.
In the House of Lords, Lord Westburyin his opinion
says: "A contract for a valuable consideration,by which
it is agreed to make a present transfer of property,
passes at once the beneficial interest, provided the
contract is such as a court of Equity would direct to be
specifically performed. A contract for the sale of
goods, as, for example, of 500 chests of tea, is not a
contract which would be specifically performed, for no
particular chests are referred to; but a contract to
sell 500 chests of the particular kind of tea which is
now in my warehouse in Gloucester, is a contract relat-
ing to specific property, and which would be specifically
performed." So we !nust bear closely in mind that equity
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jurisdiction will attach only where there may be a spe-
cific performance. "It is true," he says, ,,that a deed
which confesses to convey property which is not in ex-
istence at the time of the conveyance is void at law,
simply because there is nothing to convey. So in Eq-
uity, a contract which engages to transfer property
which is not in existence, cannot operate as an imnedi-
ate alienation, merely because there is nothing to trans-
fer. But if a mortgagor agrees to sell or mortgage
property, real or personal, of which he is not possessed
at the time, and he receives the consideration for
the contract, and afterwards becomes possessed of the
property ans oring the description in the contract,
there is no doubt that a Court of Equity would compel
him to perfQrm the contract, and that the contract
would, in Equity, transfer the beneficial interest to
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the mortgagee or purchaser immediately on the property
being acquired. This, of course,assumes that the sup-
posed contract is one of that class of which a Court of
Equity would decree a specific performance. If it be
so, then imnmediately on the acquisition of the property
described, the vendor or mortgagor would hold it in
trust for the purchaser or mortgagee, according to the
terms of the contract. For if a contract be in other.
respects good and fit to be performed, and the consider-
ation has been received, incapacity to perform it at
the time of its execution will be no answer when the
means of doing so are afterwards acquired."
The case of Tadman vs. D'Epineuil, 20 Ch. Div. 758,
though at first reading, might be considered to hold
differently than the above case, is to be distinguished
In this case, "all present and future person-from it.a
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alty" was charged to secure the plaintiff for any sums
the defendant might become indebted to him. This in-
strument was held to operate as a charge against all
property belonging to the debtor at the date of the in-
strument, but did not charge after-aequired property,
because in this case, the goods were undetermined, and
equitable title to goods is confined to specific goods.
In the case of Joseph vs. Lyons, 15 Q. B. Div. 280,
argued in 1884, a jeweler, by a bill of sale, for a val-
uable consideration, assigned to the plaintiff his after.
acquired stockfin-t tadd;, subject to proviso for redemp-
tion, and before the plaintiff took possession of the
after-acquired stock, the jeweler pledged a portion of
it with the defendant who had no notice of the plain-
tiff's bill of sale. it was held that the defendant
was entitled to retain the stock in trade pledged with
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him as against the plaintiff. Tt was argued by the plain-
tiff that the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts had abol-
ished the distinction between equitable and legal inter-
ests, and therefore he had a valid legal, as well as
equitable title ; but the court held that this case was
to be distinguished from Holroyd vs. Marshall in that,
in as much as there was a pledge to the defendant, he
thus acquired a legal title to the goods, he having no
notice of the existence of the equitable lien, and that.
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act did not abolish, in
any way, the distinction between equitable and legal in-
terests. This case was also sustained in Hallas vs.
Robinson, 15 Q. B. Div. 288.
So I think we may conclude that the equitable doc.-
trine as set forth in Holroyd vs. Marshall is settled
law in England, and any cases apparently holding differ-
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ently can in some way be distinguished from it.
The American courts have in most cases arrived at
the same conclusions but a few of the state courts ary'e
loth to adopt an invasion of the common law principles.
Judge Story states the rule, in the case of Winslow vs.
Mitchell, 2 Story 630, to be as follows: "Wherever by
their contract, intended to create a positive lien or
charge, either upon real or upon personal property,
whether it is then in being or not, it attaches in equity
as a lien or charge upon the particular property, as soon
as the assignor or contractor acquirers a title thereto,
against the latter, and all other persons asserting a
claim thereto, under him, either voluntarily or with no-
tice or in bankruptcy. "
A leading case in New York is that of McCaffrey vs.
Wooden, 65 N. Y., 459, in which the lien theory was up-
29
held, but in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and a few of
the states where they keep themselves bound down to the
Common Law this case does not receive support. Grad-
ually, however, the law of Equity is spreading, and its
influence is being felt in every state of the Union, and
it is only a question of time when the early decisions on
this subject will no longer be cited as authority, and
law of chattels will have followed the path of mortgages
on realty.
WAGES
Tn the question as to whether one may make an as-
signment of wages there arises the fact that there must
be potential interest in order to make the assignment
valid at law, and in this case potential interest is
acquired by the contract by virtue of which the wages are
This is within the rule against a mort-to be earned,
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gage of a mere possibility or expectancy where there is
no present interest.
In Equity, however, it seems that future wages might
be mortgaged, even though the interest be not a present
one, provided there be a description sufficient to de-
termine specifically what particular wages are to be
mortgaged. This is quite as consistent as the possi-
bility of an equitable mortgage of the earnings of a
vessel for a voyage not yet undertaken and where no par-
ticular voyage is specified, but simply a general de-
scription is given of the freight to be earned.
A D D I T I 0 N S.
In the case of a mortgage on an unfinished article
the mortgage is held to cover the additiens made in the
course of completion as against all parties.
In 10 Gray, 334, it was held that a mortgage on
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leather cut and prepared to be manufactured into shoes
covered the shoes after they were manufactured.
Also where a debtor mortgaged a number of unfinished
pruning shears, and they were afterward finished, thus
greatly increasing their value, the mortgage was held to
cover the finished articles and the mortgagee could hold
against an attachment by a creditor of the mortgagor
In the opinion the court said: "In case materials
were mortgaged by particular description and with the
assent of- the mortgagee were manufactured into articles
not answering to that description, and so changed that
with reasonable diligence a creditor could not know that
they were the same, if he should, without actual notice
of the claim under the mortgage, attach them for the debt
of the mortgagor, it would deserve serious attention
whether, under our statute requiring mortgages of person-
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al property to be registered, the mortgagee could hold
against the attaching creditor-. But if the mortgagor,
after the mortgage add to the value of the mortgaged
property, no matter how much, the added value as between
the mortgagor and mortgagee goes to increase the security."
SUB S T I T U T ION S.
Generally in substitutions of articles for chattels
mortgaged the mortgage does not cover the article substi-
tuted where it is possible to keep those articles sepa-
rate from the mortgaged property. Thus, a mortgage
given upon goods in a store and "all renewals and sub-
stitutions for the same" does not cover subsequently
acquired goods so that the mortgagee may maintain an ac-
tion at law against the creditor. As between the par-
ties, however, to the mortgage such a mortgage would be on-
forceable . in a Court of Equity. But as between third
33
parties the mortgagee can obtain no right to the articles
substituted unless he take actual possession of the
goods.
Where there has been a commingling of goods not
mortgaged with the mortgaged property, the burden of
Pro6r rests upon the mortgagee to show that such goods
were the property of the mortgagor at the time of the
execution of the mortgage, and where the mortgage is
worded to cover goods acquired in futuro, and such goods
are so intermixed the rights of third persons are not
thereby affected, but if necessary they will be entitled
to the entire property, if the intermingling was done
with the consent of the mortgagee.
It is very important to determine what cons1titutes
notice with reference to this class of chattels under
34
consideration.
The recording of a mortgage on real or personal
property is a sufficient notice of its existence, but can
this be the case with property not in possession? At law
such a mortagage was invalid unless actual possession
was taken by the mortgagee, and therefore actual knowl-
edge of the purchaser of the existence of such a mort-
gage did not cut off his right to seize the property as
against the mortgagee not in possession. We may con-
dlude then that there can be no registration which will
be effectual against creditors or purchasers even though
they have actual notice of the registration of the mort-a
gage.
In Equity we again find a different rule. There
the mortgagee has preference - over any person with act-
ual or constructive notice, and a record of the mortgage
35
constitutes the constructive notice.
R A T I F I C A T T 0 N.
It being impossible at law to grant goods in which
there is no interest, it becomes necessary that there be
a ratification by the mortgagor upon obtaining possession
in order that the mortgagee obtained good title. The
fact that the mortgagor simply bringing future chattels
on his premises will not constitute a sufficient ratifi-
cation. It must clearly be the intention of the grantor
that the grantee shall acquire title to such Chattels
in order to give the grantee good title. A power in the
mortgage to seize such property, when taken advantage of
by the mortgagee Will as between the parties, be suffi-
cient to give the mortgage effect, and may as against
thikd persons claiming under the mortgage. Bu~t if it be
the intention of the mortgagor that such power is to ex-
36
tend to subsequent chattels, that intention must be
clearly expressed. If the mortgagee take possession of
the goods with the mortgagor's consent, after the mort-
gagor has obtained good title, though they may never
have been in the possession of the mortgagor, the effect
is the same as if the mortgagor had actually delivered
them to the mortgagee; but the property seized by the
mortgagee must be clearly included in the mortgage in
order that he may obtain good title.
Any agreement between the parties to subject prop-
erty not in possession to seizure is binding between
themselves and as against third persons with notice, or
an indorsement on the mortgage giving the mortgagee right
of sale or seizure of property not in possession at the
time of its execution, is binding.
37
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